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This paper analyzes a modiﬁed yardstick competition mechanism
(MYC), where the yardstick employed consists of a tariﬀ basket
and total costs. This mechanism has a signiﬁcant information
advantage: the regulator ”only” needs to observe total costs and
output of all ﬁrms. The modiﬁed yardstick competition mech-
anism can ensure a socially optimal outcome when allowing for
spatial and second degree price discrimination, without increas-
ing the informational requirements. We also introduce regulatory
lags in the model. A systematic comparison between the results
of traditional yardstick regulation and modiﬁed yardstick regu-
lation is carried out. Finally, we discuss the applicability of the
mechanism.
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1 1 Introduction
The seminal paper by Shleifer (16) ”A Theory of Yardstick Competition” has
been followed by a large number of theoretical developments, but a relatively
modest number of practical applications (in an even more modest number of
countries, mainly the UK). The essence of yardstick competition is to deduce
from all ﬁrms under the regulatory mechanism the regime for a particular
ﬁrm, where ”the price the regulated ﬁrm receives depends on the costs of
identical ﬁrms” (Shleifer, (16), p. 319). The concept has been embraced
by the theory of regulation under information asymmetry (for a survey see
Chong (4)); but it has also been criticized for discouraging socially optimal
investment (e.g. Dalen (6) and Sobel (17)).
In practice, yardstick competition has not become a success story among
recent regulatory approaches. England and Wales’ water and sewerage sec-
tors are the most often cited examples of real-world applications. But many
other studies and sectors have stayed at timid attempts to embrace yardstick
competition, only in order to continue without it (examples of electricity in
many countries, and public transport sectors). Assuming that information
requirements may be one obstacle to the implementation of yardstick com-
petition, we propose a modiﬁcation of the yardstick competition mechanism
introduced by Shleifer (16). Yardstick competition proposed by Shleifer can
be interpreted as diﬀerentiated cost based price caps. Firms are allowed to
charge a two-part tariﬀ where the unit price is capped to average (marginal)
costs and the ﬁxed (access) charge1 is bounded to ﬁxed costs. The main clue
which makes this type of cost related regulation viable is the introduction
of a ”shadow ﬁrm” representing the average of all other local monopolists
under the regulatory regime. Costs of this virtual ﬁrm are calculated by av-
eraging over all variable and ﬁxed costs except those of that ﬁrm for which
the price caps are determined. This kind of regulation, introducing a vir-
tual competition between otherwise unrelated local monopolists, leads to a
socially optimal allocation both with regard to output and to ﬁrm’s internal
cost structure. Even if ﬁrms are heterogenous the mechanism can be properly
adapted to allow for local idiosyncrasies.
Nevertheless, there remain some problems when the mechanism is put
into practice. Most obviously, the mechanism can be exploited strategically
1Instead of a ﬁxed charge Shleifer considers a transfer from a regulatory authority.
Mathematically, this is equivalent.
2. This is known in the literature and proposals have been made to overcome
this vulnerability. Tangeras (19) introduced a collusion-proof mechanism;
and Potters et al.(12) analyzed the eﬀectiveness of various types of yardstick
competition systems within an experimental study where participants could
collude within a repeated game setting. However, in the following we do not
deal with these problems. Instead, we concentrate on other issues associated
with the basic yardstick competition model.
The mechanism assumes that the regulatory authority can observe vari-
able costs and ﬁxed costs separately for each ﬁrm. This requires precise ac-
counting rules which can exclude the manipulation of accounting. Such rules
along with the proper monitoring system might be diﬃcult to put into prac-
tice, in particular if monopolists are multiproduct/multiservice ﬁrms. The
mechanism that we propose can work without this informational requirement.
In addition, yardstick competition does not allow for optimal price discrimi-
nation. The traditional mechanism supports only an optimal uniform tariﬀ.
It is now well known that if we allow for consumer heterogeneity, an optimal
non-linear tariﬀ system can be found that sorts consumers optimally. For
instance, Goldberg, Leland and Sibley (10) showed that this tariﬀ system
implies an optimal deviation from marginal costs for all customer groups
except the one with the highest demand.2 Yardstick competition excludes
optimal deviations from marginal costs by construction.
Our modiﬁcations proposed utilize regulation mechanisms introduced in
the literature and combine them with the ”shadow ﬁrm” approach of yard-
stick competition. Instead of regulating each element of the two-part tariﬀ
separately, we impose a tariﬀ basket regulation and link it to yardstick com-
petition. Armstrong and Sappington (1) analyze basket tariﬀ regulation. A
reference unit price is set by the regulatory authority and ﬁrms are allowed
to charge a two-part tariﬀ. The regulation provides that total revenue must
not exceed the revenue collected under the reference unit price. The main
drawback of this regulation device is that the ﬁrst best allocation cannot be
reached. Nevertheless, this kind of regulation works better than average rev-
enue regulation (see e.g. Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (2)) within a static
model framework. However, both regulation schemes require the authority to
have a notion of how to set the reference unit price, i.e. the demand function
must be known by the regulatory authority.
2This property of self-selecting tariﬀs can be found in many advanced microeconomic
textbook, see e.g. Gravelle and Rees (11) or Wolfstetter (22).
3Our modiﬁed yardstick competition scheme takes the tariﬀ basket regu-
lation and inserts, for the quantity weights the average output of all monop-
olists, except the ﬁrm under regulation. Further, it replaces revenue under
the reference price regime by average total costs of all monopolists except
the one under consideration. We will show that this yields a socially optimal
Nash-Cournot equilibrium. In addition to the desirable allocative properties,
this modiﬁcation requires no knowledge about demand or cost functions.
The observability of output, prices and total costs of each local monopolist
is suﬃcient to implement the scheme.
Regulatory mechanims which do not rely on prior beliefs of the regulator
are called non-bayesian (Vogelsang (20)). They are veriﬁable in the sense
that they only use observable variables like costs, prices and output. Hence,
yardstick competition is a member of this class. The repeated application
of regulatory schemes may enhance welfare considerably. Moreover, many
dynamic regulatory schemes with fewer informational requirements than their
twins in a static context. Many of these dynamic schemes are non-bayesian
and rely exclusively on observable data.
On the other hand, some additional strategic problems can emerge. Cur-
rier (5) showed that strategic behavior of ﬁrms under average-revenue-lagged
regulation can lead to the unregulated global proﬁt maximum. Also, more
sophisticated mechanisms like the VF-mechanism developed by Vogelsang
and Finsinger (21) may be susceptible to strategic behavior of non-myopic
ﬁrms (see Sappington (13)). This extends also to the well-known incremental
surplus subsidy (ISS) mechanism developed by Sappington and Sibley (14).
This mechanism is not proof against abuse, i.e. the managerial exploitation
for fringe beneﬁts.
The dynamic version of our modiﬁed yardstick competition is a hybrid of
Shleifer’s mechanism and the dynamic subsidy scheme developed by Finsinger
and Vogelsang (7). We introduce a one-period lag in the regulatory constraint
with regard to the quantity weights of the revenue basket and total costs. We
can show that the dynamic version of the modiﬁed mechanism approaches
the optimal steady state more slowly than the lagged Shleifer yardstick com-
petition. Hence, welfare losses can be identiﬁed that must be set oﬀ against
welfare increases due to optimal price discrimination. In contrast to other
mechanisms in the literature, the dynamic version of our modiﬁed yardstick
competition performs less well than in the static version. We nevertheless
wanted to introduce a dynamic lagged version, because we believe that gath-
ering all information and calculating the relevant constraints for all local
4monopolists requires time. Speciﬁcally, this applies for the case of heteroge-
nous ﬁrms were the basic model has to be supplemented by an econometric
analysis to allow for idiosyncrasies.
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following way: the next
section develops the basic static model, and compares the information re-
quirements of marginal-cost regulation with those of the one proposed in
this paper. We ﬁnd that the modiﬁed yardstick competition (MYC) leads
to a socially optimal allocation, a Nash-equilibrium which is symmetric and
unique. We are also able to show that the modiﬁed yardstick competition
mechanism will lead to socially optimal allocation in the case of spatial price
discrimination. Section 3 then develops the dynamic version of the model:
we introduce a regulatory lag, whereby the (regulated) price pi depends on
the observed cost ci in the previous period. We distinguish two types of be-
havior: i) myopic behavior by the regulated companies, and ii) ﬁrms with a
long-run planning horizon maximizing their present value (”strategic behav-
ior”). Section 4 investigates the welfare properties of both regulation regimes
(Yardstick and Modiﬁed Yardstick) during the transition period, whereas we
conﬁne ourselves to a linear model structure. Section 5 summarizes and pro-
vides an outlook on the potential use of the modiﬁed yardstick mechanism.
2 The basic static model
The following mathematical structure is based on the one-period model of
Shleifer(16). There are n identical local monopolies supplying a local market




′′(pi) ≤ 0; i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (1)
where pi is the local price of ﬁrm i. Note that we have assumed identical
demand functions. In the following we utilize the inverse demand function
p(xi), p
′(xi) < 0,p
′′(xi) ≤ 0, i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (2)
The cost function of ﬁrm i is
K(xi,ci) = cixi + R(ci), i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (3)
5where ci are marginal costs that are endogenous, i.e. ﬁrms can choose their
level. Reducing ci leads to costs according to the function
R(ci),Rc(ci) < 0, Rcc(ci) > 0, i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (4)
These expenses are ﬁxed costs. Without loss of generality we also assume
that R(cmax) = 0, where cmax solves minc[R(c)], i.e. the minimum level of
ﬁxed costs achievable is zero.
All ﬁrms are identical with regard to technology and local production
conditions. The optimal allocation and the optimal tariﬀ can be derived






p(vi)dvi − cixi − R(ci)] ∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (5)
The ﬁrst order conditions that determine the optimal values {x∗,c∗} are:
p(xi) = ci, −xi − Rc(ci) = 0 (6)
To assure that (6) characterizes a global maximum we assume that the welfare
function is concave, i.e.
p
′(xi) < 0, Rcc(ci) > 0, −p
′(xi) > 1/Rcc(ci),∀xi,ci (7)
Additionally, we assume an interior solution which requires that
−Rc(0) > x
max, wherep(x
max) = 0; (8)
p(0) > ˆ c(0) (9)
where ˆ c(xi) solves the ﬁrst order condition −xi−Rc(c) = 0. Figure 1 collects
all these assumptions (which also underly the model of Shleifer) and indicates
the optimal allocation {x∗
i,c∗
i} as well as the optimal tariﬀ {p∗
i,π∗
i}.
To verify that the hatched area under ˆ c(x) is equal to π∗
i recall that the
price p∗
i is equal to ˆ c. Hence, ﬁxed costs must be covered by the access fee
π∗
i = R(c∗). From −x − Fc(c) = 0 we can calculate the inverse of ˆ c(xi) to
which we refer as ˆ x(ci). Utilizing the ﬁrst order condition with respect to c
yields (subscript i omitted):
Z cmax
c∗












Figure 1: The optimal solution
In his seminal article Shleifer (16) showed that separate price caps for the











R(cj) ∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (11)
lead to a ﬁrst best outcome that is the result of maximizing the social welfare
function in each location.3
Establishing this kind of yardstick competition requires that the regula-
tion authority observes all prices and all costs separated according to unit
costs and (common) ﬁxed costs. The information set IY C necessary to enforce
the mechanism is
I
Y C = {pi,πi,ci,R(ci),∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n}} (12)
Note that the regulator only needs to know ex post values and no functional
relationships like demand or cost functions. Regulation mechanisms of this
3Shleifer derives second - best prices under a linear tariﬀ system as well. In this case
optimal unit prices equal total averagecosts. Yardstick competition supports this outcome.
7kind are called non-Bayesian because no a priori knowledge on the part of
the regulator is needed.4
However, the regulator is required to understand how variable and ﬁxed
costs are calculated and must secure that cost information is correct, i.e.
separated according to these rules. This problem can be aggravated if ﬁrms
serve diﬀerent customers and are allowed to discriminate prices (third de-
gree price discrimination). Take the water sector as an example. Usually,
local drinking water supply and the sewerage system is based on a spatial
distribution system. To guarantee optimal conveyance investments spatial
price discrimination should be allowed.5 If the local private drinking water
provider or a privately run sanitation system discriminates user services in
terms of distribution costs, the regulatory authority needs to know the exact
cost structure in terms of spatial location of each user group. This increases
the information requirements considerably.
Beyond the information problems of spatial price discrimination the prob-
lem of regulating non-linear tariﬀs remains within the regulation scheme (11).
If the regulation authority would allow second degree price discrimination in
the presence of heterogenous customers, the yardstick mechanism (11) cannot
be implemented because marginal prices should not be restricted to marginal
costs.6
In the following we extend the modiﬁed yardstick competition mecha-
nism to spatial and second degree price discrimination without increasing
the informational requirements on the part of the regulatory authority.












[cjxj + R(cj)], ∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n}
(13)
4For a recent overview of diﬀerent regulation mechanisms see Armstrong and Sapping-
ton (1).
5Chakravorty, Hochman and Zilberman (3) showed that spatially uniform prices lead
to suboptimal investments.
6Optimal second degree price discrimination leads to optimal deviations of marginal
prices from marginal costs except for the user group with the highest demand, see Gold-
man, Leland and Sibley (10).






xj, ∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (14)
To calculate these values and to impose the regulation mechanism the
regulatory authority must be able to observe the ex post values of total costs,
quantities of services sold and, of course, the tariﬀ of each ﬁrm. The set of
necessary information is called IMY C and it contains
I
MY C = {pi,πi,xi,Ki,∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n}} (15)
The regulation constraint that triggers the competition process is
pi¯ x−i + πi ≤ ¯ K−i, ∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (16)
The calculated revenue of ﬁrm i must not exceed it’s calculated costs. Notice
that ﬁrm i cannot manipulate these values. In contrast to the mechanism
proposed by Shleifer, ﬁrms under the MYC-mechanism have two degrees of
freedom when choosing pi,πi,ci under the regulation constraint (16). The
maximization program of ﬁrm i is
max
xi,πi,ci
[p(xi)xi + πi − cixi − R(ci)], s.t. (16) (17)
Note that we choose the price pi indirectly by choosing xi. Assuming an
interior solution of (17) we can calculate from the ﬁrst order conditions7 :
[p(xi) − ci] + p
′(xi)(xi − ¯ x−i) = 0 (18)
and
−xi − Rc(ci) = 0 (19)
The second condition determines the eﬃcient amount of cost reducing in-
vestment conditional on services supplied. The ﬁrst condition indicates a
Cournot monopolist trying to equate marginal revenue to marginal costs un-
der a regulatory constraint.
The properties of the MYC-mechanism can be summarized as follows.
7Suﬃcient conditions for a global maximum are speciﬁed in the appendix (proof to
proposition 1).
9proposition 1 The modiﬁed yardstick competition MYC leads to a social op-
timal allocation, i.e. the Nash equilibrium {pMY C,cMY C} is equal to {p∗,c∗},
where {p∗,c∗} solves program (5). The access fee is equal to ﬁxed costs R(c∗)
and, as a result, proﬁts are zero. The Nash equilibrium is symmetric and
unique.
Proof: see appendix
These properties can also be extended to the case of third degree price
discrimination when a local monopolist i sets spatially diﬀerentiated prices.
Suppose there are m diﬀerent consumer groups, and for serving them the ﬁrm




[pikxk(pik) + πik − cikxik − R(ci1,ci2,    ,cim)] (20)
where R(.) is a convex cost function of cost reducing investments. The reg-





















xjk, ∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (22)
The yardstick competition is established by introducing the regulatory con-
straint X
k
[pik¯ x−ik + πik] ≤ ¯ K−i, ∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (23)
This constraint is a straightforward extension of (16) for the case of spatial
price discrimination. Since it is a similarly straightforward exercise to derive
the Nash equilibrium from the ﬁrst order condition, we conﬁne ourselves to
summarizing the main results.
corollary 1 The extended yardstick competition mechanism for spatial price
discrimination leads to a socially optimal allocation. The necessary informa-
tion set of the regulatory authority requires the observability of total costs, all
prices and all service units delivered to m consumer groups.
Proof: similar to the proof of proposition (1) and, hence, omitted.
10Second degree price discrimination requires a non-linear expenditure func-
tion that depends on the quantity sold to each consumer. The construction
of such a tariﬀ system selecting consumers according to demand relevant
characteristics is well documented in the literature.8 It can be derived for
a proﬁt maximizing monopolist as well as for a social surplus maximizing
ﬁrm. It is known that the optimal expense function is such that marginal
expenses, i.e. unit prices, are above marginal costs except for the consumer
group with the highest demand. But this property cannot be achieved under
yardstick competition YC (see (11)) due to the restriction that unit prices
equal marginal costs.
The modiﬁed yardstick competition allows for second degree price dis-
crimination without more information on the part of the regulator. The
information set is identical to the case of spatial price discrimination. The
regulator needs to observe the tariﬀ system, the service output sold to the
diﬀerent consumer groups and total costs of each ﬁrm.
In the following we show how to establish yardstick competition within a
simple model for two consumer groups.9 Two types of consumers exist, ”low”
and ”high” consumers. To assure that the optimal tariﬀ system implies a
sorting solution we assume (single crossing property).
xl(p) < xh(p), ∀x (24)
where the subscripts l and h stand for ”low” and ”high”, respectively. Cus-




pi(vi)dvi − πi, i = {l,h} (25)
where ¯ pi is deﬁned implicitly by xi(¯ pi) = 0 and pi,πi is part of a sorting
two-part tariﬀ system
TPS = {pi,πi,i = l,h} (26)
Note that this system is diﬀerent to the more general one that deﬁnes
non-linear expenditure functions. In our case of two groups of customers this
8See Goldman, M., Leland, H. and S. Sibley (10).
9This goes without loss of generality. The same results apply for the case of more
than two groups or continuous characteristics of consumers. In that case, one has to add
additional incentive compatibility constraints. For further details see Wolfstetter (22) p.
27 ﬀ.
11would amount to the task of ﬁnding a sorting and optimal menu of price-
quantity combinations M = {Ti,xi i = l,h} where Ti are total expenses for
xi. Ti depends on xi (non-linear expense function). It is known that M is
more eﬃcient than the menu of sorting two-part tariﬀs, i.e. leads to a higher
aggregate consumer surplus.10 However, M cannot be implemented by the
modiﬁed yardstick competition system. A regulatory constraint that directly
restricts total revenue, i.e. Ti1 + Ti2 ≤ ¯ K−i, cannot implement the ﬁrst best
allocation {x∗,c∗}. To implement M, the ﬁrm’s revenue has to be expressed
as a linear combination of prices and quantities (see (31)). This speciﬁcation
requires that the regulator knows the (inverse) demand functions of the two
consumer types. Prices pi are the ﬁrst derivative of the nonlinear expense
function T(xi). The ﬁrst derivatives of T(x) at xl and xh are pl(xl) and
ph(xh), respectively. The calculation of this values requires the regulatory
authority to know the (inverse) demand functions of both consumer groups l
and h. Hence, given the information set IMY C the regulatory authority can
only implement yardstick competition by the two-part tariﬀ system TPS.
It remains to introduce the constraints for price discrimination. The
incentive compatibility constraints are
Sl(pl,πl) − Sl(ph,πh) ≥ 0 (27)
Sh(ph,πh) − Sh(pl,πl) ≥ 0 (28)
The necessary participation constraints are:
Sl(pl,πl) ≥ Sl(0,0) = 0 (29)
Sh(ph,πh) ≥ Sh(0,0) = 0 (30)
From (27) and (28) follows that S2(p2,π2) > 0.11
The suitable MCY for second degree price discrimination is
[pl¯ x−il + πl] + [ph¯ x−ih + πh] ≤ ¯ K−i, ∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (31)
The local monopolist maximizes proﬁts subject to the incentive compatibility
constraints, the participation constraint and the MYC-constraint.
corollary 2 The MYC for second degree price discrimination secures the
social optimal allocation as Nash-equilibrium.
Proof: see appendix.
10See Wolfstetter (22), p. 33.
11Since this is a well-known property, a proof is omitted. See e.g. Wolfstetter (22).
12Second degree price discrimination is optimal if the monopolist is regulated
according to modiﬁed yardstick competition. We have shown that proﬁt max-
imizing under the MYC-mechanism leads to an optimal allocation. Allowing
for second degree price discrimination implies some further constraints and
some additional variables into the relevant two optimization programs (5)
and (17), yet without eliminating the basic equivalence of both programs.
3 Yardstick competition under regulatory lags
Both yardstick competition mechanisms were introduced within a static model
where the ﬁnal allocation is immediately reached as a Nash-equilibrium.
However, one has to bear in mind that the competition forces do not unfold
within a market process but as a result of the interference of a regulatory
body. This virtual competition is organized and institutionalized and re-
quires a variety of eﬀorts by the regulator, e.g. the gathering of information,
the calculation of costs, the econometric analysis in the case of heterogenous
ﬁrms, and the monitoring of ﬁrms. These activities require time and, hence,
may lead to regulatory lags. Thus, it is interesting to introduce regulation
lags and to study how these aﬀect the properties of the two mechanisms (YC
and MYC).
First, suppose that the yardstick competition mechanism of Shleifer is
lagged such that price caps today are derived from average marginal costs of










j , i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (32)
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j , ∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (35)







i ≤ ¯ K
t−1
−i , ∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n} (36)
The main question to be answered is how ﬁrms behave in the presence
of these two regulatory lags. Two cases can be distinguished: Myopic ﬁrms
maximizing current proﬁts, and ﬁrms with a long run planning horizon max-
imizing their present value. In the latter case, the dynamic nature of the
problem needs the introduction of dynamic game theory.
However, we ﬁrst want to analyze the dynamic properties of the two
mechanisms when ﬁrms are myopic. Later, we will show that the sequence
of Nash-equilibria of one period games played by myopic ﬁrms is subgame
perfect within a repeated game.
If yardstick competition according to (32) and (33) is applied, ﬁrm i will
















i)], ∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n}, ∀t ∈ [1,2,    ,∞)
(37)
The sequence of symmetric Nash-equilibrium is characterized by
p
t,Y C = c
t−1,Y C and −x(p
t,Y C)−Fc(c
t,Y C) = 0, ∀t ∈ [1,2,    ,∞) (38)
which leads to the non-linear diﬀerence equation
−x(c
t−1,Y C) − Fc(c
t,Y C) = 0 (39)
Utilizing this diﬀerence equation we can state the following result:
12This constraint resembles the Vogelsang-Finsinger subsidy. Instead of an access fee,
F-V consider a subsidy and instead of the average total costs, the ﬁrm’s own total costs
are inserted. For a concise summary refer to Armstrong and Sappington (1).
14proposition 2 The Yardstick Competition process YC {pY C
t ,cY C
t } converges
to the socially optimal solution {p∗,c∗} as unique steady state.
Proof. see appendix
The result is not surprising if one recalls the assumption made to guarantee
the existence of a unique optimal solution summarized graphically in Figure
1. However, it also shows that it requires a certain amount of time to reach
the optimal solution. Hence, if one compares the properties of the two com-
petition mechanisms one has to take into account the dynamic adjustment
process as a further criterion of assessment.
Strictly speaking, the dynamic process is only deﬁned for adjustments
guaranteeing non-negative proﬁts in each period. For instance, if the regu-
lation device is introduced into a market without regulation, where all ﬁrms
hold local monopoly power, then proﬁts are positive until the process reaches
the steady state. Hence, the regulation process is economically viable. But
assume that yardstick competition has been introduced and the optimal so-
lution is reached. If demand shrinks for some reasons an adjustment process
begins towards the respective steady state. During this process proﬁts are
negative in each period. Since in the steady state ﬁrms end up with zero
proﬁt, there is no opportunity to cover these losses later. As a result, all
ﬁrms would leave the market.13
In the following we do not want to elaborate on the optimal proﬁt al-
lowances in the face of uncertain demand but stick to the basic model. Hence,
we analyze the adjustment process of MY C that is introduced in an unreg-
ulated market.14
The dynamic properties of the modiﬁed yardstick competition follow from
the behavior of ﬁrms maximizing their proﬁts (37) under the regulatory con-
straint (36). The sequence of Nash-Cournot-equilibria are characterized by
13This problem is a disadvantage of dynamic regulation schemes with lagged adjust-
ments, see Armstrong and Sappingtion (1). There have been some proposals to alleviate
or to eliminate this problem. The remedy is to introduce a cost-plus scheme, i.e. to allow
proﬁts in the steady state. In turn, these additions lead to an opportunity to exploit the
regulation mechanism strategically (see (1)). However, in the case of yardstick competi-
tion this disadvantage cannot occur since the proﬁt constraint of ﬁrm i does not depend
on Ki.
14One can also assume that the starting point of the MY C-process is characterized
by a cost-plus-regulated monopolist. The crucial point is that the allocation of these
monopolies is closer to the Cournot-solution than ﬁrms within a MY C-scheme.
15the ﬁrst-order conditions15
[p(x
t,MY C) − ˆ c(x
t,MY C)] + p
′(x
t,MY C)(x
t,MY C − x
t−1,MY C) = 0 (40)
where ˆ c is deﬁned by the ﬁrst order condition
−x
t,MY C − Fc(ˆ c) = 0 (41)
The dynamic process of the MY C-mechanism takes place through the
non-linear diﬀerence equation (40). It can be shown that the steady state is
optimal and asymptotically stable.
proposition 3 The Modiﬁed Yardstick Competition process MYC {pMY C
t ,cMY C
t }
converges to the socially optimal solution {p∗,c∗} as unique steady state.
Proof: see appendix
Introducing a regulatory lag leads to a dynamic structure of the regula-
tion process. As a result, the strategic behavior of ﬁrms has to be taken into
account. In our model, we have to analyze the nature of subgame perfect
equilibria. These equilibria are the result of strategy formation of non-myopic
ﬁrms.16 Firms take into account how their decisions in period t aﬀect the
Nash-Cournot-equilibrium in period t + 1, and so forth. As a result, the
sequence of one-period strategies of myopic ﬁrms is not the same as the se-
quence of subgame perfect strategies. However, in the regulatory framework
of Yardstick Competition both sequences coincide.
proposition 4 The sequence of Nash-Cournot-equilibria that results from
the proﬁt maximizing behavior of myopic ﬁrms is also subgame perfect, i.e.
is a closed loop equilibrium of the multi-stage game.
Proof: see appendix.
Firms cannot gain from looking ahead. The tariﬀ choice in period t cannot
aﬀect the strategy equilibrium in period t+1 since the regulatory constraint
(36) for period t + 1 does not depend on these instruments. The regulatory
constraint of period t + 1 does only depend on the choice of the other n − 1
15Note that we have solved the problem by maximizing with respect to xt,ct,πt. The
corresponding price pt follows from the inverse demand function.
16In fact, the concept of subgame perfectness was introduced by Selten (15) within a
traditional oligopoly model. The dynamic structure was the result of demand slackness.
16ﬁrms. Hence, the yardstick competition mechanism is not vulnerable against
strategic behavior.
As we know from repeated games of inﬁnite length other subgame perfect
equilibria do exist17. Notice however, that the yardstick competition mech-
anism is not captured by the model structure of repeated games due to the
dependence of payoﬀs in period t on actions taken in period t−1. To answer
the question whether a trigger strategy exists within the YC- and the MYC-
mecanism entails comparing the present value of proﬁts under tacit collusion
of all ﬁrms with the extra proﬁts in the case of defection in period t and the
present value of the following decreasing proﬁts from t + 1 until the steady
state is reached. The main diﬀerence to the analysis of repeated games is
that both equilibrium strategies cannot keep proﬁts constant. In the steady
state proﬁts are zero.18
4 A linear model
So far, the analysis has shown that both competition mechanisms lead ﬁrms
into a eﬃcient steady state as a unique equilibrium. It remains to investigate
the welfare properties of both regulation systems during the transition period.
The comparison of both systems along the transition path depends on the
functional forms and on parameter values of the relevant diﬀerence equations.
We conﬁne the following analysis to a linear model structure, which allows
us to keep the formal structure simple.
To begin with, we introduce the linear inverse demand function
p(x) = B − bx; p
′(x) = −b (42)
Accordingly, optimal marginal costs can be generated by
Rc(c) = −A + ac, c ∈ [0,A/a] (43)
To guarantee the existence of a unique interior social optimum we have
to recall conditions (7) and (8):
−p(x) > 1/Rcc(c) → b > 1/a and p(0) > ˆ c(0) → B > A/a (44)
17See Fudenberg and Tirole (8). It is known that trigger strategies can sustain cooper-
ative solutions (Folk theorem).
18This is an important aspect that merits further research.
17where ˆ c is deﬁned in (19).
When inserting these functions into the diﬀerence equation (39) and re-
calling the lag structure of the regulatory mechanism, i.e. pt,Y C = ct−1,Y C










Similarly, one can calculate the respective linear diﬀerence equation for
the Modiﬁed Yardstick Competition. When inserting the functional forms










To compare the two diﬀerence equations we depict the dynamic structure









Figure 2: Comparing price trajectories
From the picture we can derive that the price of the YC-mechanism con-
verges quicker to the optimal steady state than the price of the modiﬁed
18yardstick mechanism. Notice that this applies to all admissible parameter
values sustaining an interior optimal solution.
proposition 5 The price path of YC is lower than that of MYC, .i.e. pt,Y C <
pt,MY C,∀t.
Proof: see appendix.
The speed of price adjustment is an indicator of the welfare properties
of both regulatory mechanisms. Obviously the YC-mechanism is superior to
the MYC-mechanism in terms of welfare. This can be explained with the
help of Figure 3.











Figure 3: Welfare eﬀects
Let us start from the unregulated Cournot solution19 {pM,cM}. If the two
mechanisms are implemented, prices in period 1 decrease to cM in the case
of the YC-mechanism and to pMY C,1 for the modiﬁed yardstick competition.
Note that pMY C,1 > cM 20. From (39) we know how marginal costs are
19In the following we neglect the Index i.
20This follows from the comparison of the relevant diﬀerence equations (see Figure 2).
At the outset the price is the unregulated Cournot price pM. In the ﬁrst period p1,Y C is
equal to cM by deﬁnition. From Figure 2 we see that pMY C,1 > cM.
19adjusted to the output oﬀered within the YC-mechanism. From (41) we can
calculate the optimal marginal costs for ﬁrms under the MYC-mechanism. If
we plot prices, output and marginal costs for both mechanisms in the picture
we can identify total surplus for both regulatory systems: total surplus gain
after period 1 induced by the MYC-mechanism is indicated by the light gray
area. Total surplus realized by Shleifer’s mechanism is the sum of both, the
light and the dark gray area. Yardstick competition as proposed by Shleifer
realizes welfare gains more quickly than the MYC-mechanism.
However, to reach a ﬁnal assessment of both mechanisms one has to com-
pare these welfare eﬀects during the transition periods with total welfare
reached in the steady state. For instance, if a regulatory authority intro-
duces the MYC-mechanism instead of yardstick competition as introduced
by Shleifer to allow for second degree price discrimination it must take into
account the slower increase of total welfare and balance these losses to future
welfare gains due to a discriminatory tariﬀ structure.
5 Summary and Outlook
In this paper we have introduced a modiﬁed yardstick competition mech-
anism which allows for price discrimination. In a static model we have
shown that the MYC-mechanism replicates the social optimum as a Nash-
equilibrium. In addition, the mechanism is based on an information set that
seems to be more accessible for the regulatory authority than that of the
YC-mechanism. Speciﬁcally, the regulatory authority does not need to sep-
arate total costs into ﬁxed (capital) costs and variable costs. If the local
monopolies are multiproduct ﬁrms the regulatory agency does not need to
know the true allocation of costs to customer groups. The knowledge of total
costs and output sold to customers is suﬃcient to implement the mechanism.
Firms are not required to link prices to variable costs. Price discrimination
is possible and, hence, leads to increased total welfare.
If one takes regulatory lags into account, then it turns out that the MYC-
mechanism is approaching the optimal steady state slower than yardstick
competition as introduced by Shleifer. As a result, a total assessment of both
systems has to take into account the welfare eﬀects during the transition path
with total welfare in the steady state.
It remains to discuss how the MYC-mechanism can be implemented when
20ﬁrms are heterogenous. Shleifer has proposed a ”reduced-form” regulation.21
In the case of yardstick competition the regulatory authority runs a regression
of variable costs c against observable exogenous characteristics, say θ. The
main clue of the regression is that it only includes the variables of all j ﬁrms
except i if the price caps for ﬁrm i are calculated.
When we introduce the MYC-mechanism, the ”reduced-form” approach
of Shleifer has to be modiﬁed as follows: ﬁrst, regressions must be run be-
tween total costs and the observable characteristics. Again, total costs for
ﬁrm i allowing for local characteristics are calculated without utilizing the
total costs of ”i” reported to the regulatory authority. Total costs acknowl-
edged for ﬁrm i are ˆ Ki = ˆ α+ ˆ βθi where ˆ α, ˆ β are estimated parameters of the
reduced form.22 Secondly, regressions between output and the characteris-
tics have to be run. Again, the relevant output in the regulatory constraint
(16) is determined by the predictor ˆ xi = ˆ δ + ˆ γθi, where ˆ δ,ˆ γ are the respec-
tive estimates. Of course, this approach can also be extended to the case of
multiproduct ﬁrms either under second degree or third degree price discrim-
ination. We have to add regression equations which refer to the output of
each consumer group.
The modiﬁed yardstick mechanism (MYC) has the clear advantage of
reduced information requirements, and thus a potential improvement over
the current applications. Further research should address the comparison
with traditional yardstick competition in more depth, speciﬁcally with regard
to investment behavior and tacit collusion, as well as technical issues of
implementation.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We ﬁrst show that the optimal solution {x∗,c∗} is a symmetric Nash-Cournot-
equilibrium. Recall the ﬁrst order conditions (18) and (19) and insert {xMY C
i =
x∗,cMY C
i = c∗,∀i}. Notice thereby, ¯ x−i = x∗. This yields the ﬁrst order conditions
for a social optimum (6). Hence, {x∗,c∗} is a Nash-Cournot-equilibrium. Since
an interior optimal solution exists per assumption, a symmetric Nash-Cournot-
21See Shleifer (16) p. 324.
22We restrict our discussion to the case where a linear speciﬁcation are suﬃciently good
predictors.
21equilibrium exists as well. The uniqueness of the optimal solution implies also
that only one symmetric Nash-Cournot-equilibrium exists. Since the prices p∗
i
equal constant marginal costs c∗
i, it follows from (31) that the access fee πi covers
the ﬁxed costs F(c∗
i) and that proﬁts are zero.
It remains to show that no asymmetric Nash-Cournot-equilibrium exists. To
do so, we ﬁrst have to assure that the ﬁrst order conditions (18) and (19) are
necessary and suﬃcient for solving (17). According to a theorem of Arrow23, the
Kuhn-Tucker-conditions are necessary and suﬃcient if both the proﬁt function and
the regulation constraint are quasi-concave. The assumptions with regard to the
cost function and the inverse demand function secure the quasi-concavity of the
constraint (16) and of the proﬁt function.
From (19) we can ﬁnd the optimal response-function ˆ c(xi) which solves −xi −
Rc(c) = 0. Inserting this response function into (18) and multiplying by n − 1
yields
p′(xi)[(n − 1)xi −
X
j =i
xj] + (n − 1)[p(xi) − ˆ c(xi)] = 0 (47)
which yields after some arrangements
p′(xi)[xi − ¯ X] +
n − 1
n
[p(xi) − ˆ c(xi)] = 0 (48)
where ¯ X = 1
n
Pn
i=1 xi is the average value of all outputs xi. (48) is the implicit
form of an inclusive reaction function24 deﬁning xi as a function of ¯ X.
If we now assume, per absurdum, an asymmetric Nash-Cournot equilibrium,
then there must be at least one ﬁrm, say ﬁrm k, choosing output xk > ¯ X and at
least one ﬁrm, say ﬁrm m, choosing xm < ¯ X. From (48) it follows that p(xk) −
ˆ c(xk) > 0 and p(xm) − ˆ c(xm) < 0 respectively. But this cannot be, since p(xk) −
ˆ c(xk) > 0 and p(xm) − ˆ c(xm) < 0 imply that xk < xm (see above Figure). Hence,
no asymmetric Nash-Cournot-equilibrium exists.
6.2 Proof of corollary 2
To proof the corollary we ﬁrst have to determine the socially optimal two-part
tariﬀ system TPS∗. Since its properties are well known we keep the following
characterization very brief.25 The optimal tariﬀ system maximizes total consumer
surplus
Sl(pl,πl) + Sh(ph,π2h) (49)
23See Takayama (18).
24See e.g. Wolfstetter (22) p. 91.
25For further details see e.g. Wolfstetter (22) or Gravelle and Rees (11), 280-283.
22subject to the constraints (27) (with Lagrangean λ1), (28)(with Lagrangean λ2),
(29)(with Lagrangean λ3) and the proﬁt constraint (with Lagrangean λ4)
(pl − c)xl + πl + (ph − c)xh + πh − F(c) ≥ 0. (50)
Note that we have omitted the subscript i due to the assumption of identical ﬁrms.
From the Kuhn-Tucker-conditions it is straightforward to show that
λ4(pl − c)x′
l(pl) + λ2(xh(pl) − xl(pl) = 0 (51)
λ4(ph − c)x′
h(ph) = 0 (52)
−(xl(pl) + xh(ph)) − Fc(c) = 0 (53)
where λ4 > 0 and λ2 > 0. These equations follow as a result of the single-
crossing-property (24) and the assumption that the Coase-tariﬀ TPScoase = {pl =
ph = c∗;πl = πh = F(c∗)/2} cannot be implemented, due to the violation of the
participation constraint (29). In the case of a pooling tariﬀ structure, the consumer
surplus of the l-group would be negative. Hence, a sorting tariﬀ structure is to be
implemented. Prices pi,i = l,h, are chosen such that consumers with low demand
are priced above marginal costs and consumers with high demand pay marginal
costs for each service unit. Moreover, we know that the surplus of consumers
with high demand is fully exploited and that proﬁts are zero. In addition, it is
also known that λ1 = 0 since the incentive compatibility constraint (27) ist not
binding. Collecting all relevant equations, the optimal price discrimination TSP∗
and the optimal choice of costs c∗ are determined by equations (28), (29), (50),
(52) and (53).
The corresponding two-part tariﬀ structure under Yardstick Competition fol-
lows from deriving the Nash-Cournot-equilibrium. Each ﬁrm i maximizes proﬁts
(pil − ci)xil + πil + (pih − ci)xih + πih − F(ci) (54)
subject to the constraints (27) (with Lagrangean λi1), (28)(with Lagrangean λi2),
(29)(with Lagrangean λi3) and the regulation constraint (31) (with Lagrangean µi),
∀i ∈ {1,2,    ,n}. The proﬁt maximizing tariﬀ ist characterized by the following
ﬁrst order conditions:
(pil − ci)x′
il(pil) + xil(pil)(1 − λi1 − λi3) − µi¯ x−il + λi2xih(pil) = 0 (55)
1 − µi − λi1 + λi2 − λi3 = 0 (56)
(pih − ci)x′
ih(pih) + xih(pih)(1 − λi2) − µi¯ x−ih + λi1xil(pih) = 0 (57)
1 − µi + λi1 − λi2 = 0 (58)
−(xil(pl) + xih(pih)) − Fc(ci) = 0 (59)
23Assuming the existence of a symmetric Nash-Cournot-equilibrium, TPSMY C, and
inserting (56) into (55) and (58) into (57), respectively, yields the equations (drop-
ping the subscript i)
(pl − c)x′
l(pl) + λ2(xh(pl) − xl(pl)) = 0 (60)
(ph − c)x′
h(ph) + λ1(xl(ph) − xh(ph)) = 0 (61)
It remains to show that, jointly with the constraints (27), (28), (29) and (31), the
equations (60) and (61) determine the optimal solution TPS∗, i.e. TPSMY C =
TPS∗.
To begin with, note that ﬁrms do not choose a unique two-part tariﬀ. Assume,
per absurdum, that TPSMY C = {pl = ph;πl = πh}. Then, by (60) and (61) it
follows that λi1 = λi2 = 0. Together with (53) we can infer that TPSMY C =
TPSCoase which, by assumption, cannot be implemented. Hence, λi1 ≥ 0 and/or
λi2 ≥ 0, one of which with strong inequality. From (60) and (61) it follows that
pMY C
l > pMY C
h .
Next, we show, that λ1 = 0. To do so, we assume per absurdum the contrary,
λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0. From (60) and (61) it follows:
pl = c and ph < c (62)
The incentive compatibility constraints (27) and (28) can be rewritten as
Z pl
ph
xh(v)dv ≥ πh − πl (63)
and Z pl
ph
xl(v)dv ≤ πh − πl (64)
Since λ1 > 0, by assumption, the ﬁrst constraint is binding. Before we pro-
ceed, notice that in a symmetric Nash-equilibrium the regulation constraint (31)
is nothing else but a proﬁt constraint:26
(pl − ˆ c)xl + (ph − ˆ c)xh + πl + πh − F(c) = 0 (65)
where the ﬁrst term is zero, by (62). Rearranging (63) and inserting it into (65)








26All superscripts MY C are omitted.





R(c) > R(c∗)/2 (67)
which cannot be, by assumption (no Coase-tariﬀ). The last inequality follows from
(59)where pl = c and ph < c. Thus we have proven that λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0.
Collecting all relevant equations, the tariﬀ structure and the production costs c
under MY C are determined by the equations (28), (29), (31), (61) and (59). These
equations are identical to those determining the optimal solution {TPS∗,c∗}, i.e.
eqs. (28), (50), (51), (52)and (53). Hence, the solutions coincide.
6.3 Proof of proposition 2
To proof asymptotical stability of the diﬀerence equation (39) we diﬀerentiate with






Recalling the second order condition (7) we have p′(x) > 1/Rcc(c) → 1 >
−x′(c)/Rcc(c). Hence, the positive slope in (68) is less than 1.
As a next step set ct−1,Y C = 0. Due to (8) we can derive from −xmax −
Rcc(ct,Y C) = 0 that ct,Y C > 0, i.e. the intercept of the diﬀerence equation in
a ct,Y C − ct−1,Y C-phase diagram is positive. Since the slope is less than 1, an
asymptotically stable equilibrium exists.
6.4 Proof of proposition 3
To prove the asymptotic stability we show that the slope of ﬁrst order diﬀerence
equation (40) is positive and less than 1. Due to the assumed existence of a
unique optimal solution the steady state solution is unique as well. To show this,
insert the steady state solution xt,MY C = xt,MY C = ¯ xMY C into (40). This yields
p(¯ xMY C) = ˆ c(¯ xMY C) which is the optimal solution. To prove stability, we have
to diﬀerentiate (40) with respect to xt−1,MY C, taking xt,MY C as a function of




[p′′(xt,MY C)(xt,MY C − xt−1,MY C) + 2p′(xt,MY C) − ˆ c′(xt,MY C)]
> 0
(69)
We can see that the bracketed term in the denominator is negative for all xt,MY C ≥
xt−1,MY C and given the assumptions with respect to the second order condition
25of the optimal solution (see Figure 1). It is also a straightforward exercise to see
that the expression on the right hand side is less than 1. From (40) it follows that
xt,MY C(0) > 0. Hence, the process is asymptotically stable and converges to the
steady state.
6.5 Proof of proposition 4
We conﬁne the proof to the MYC mechanism. The proof for YC is then a straight-
forward application of the ﬁrst (MYC).
To derive a subgame perfect equilibrium we utilize the principle of optimal-
ity. Consider ﬁrm i in period t. Firm i wants to maximize the present value
of proﬁts given the history of the previous period t − 1, i.e. the vector zt−1 =
{xt−1,πt−1,ct−1}, where the boldfaces indicate n-dimensional vectors of the re-
spective variables for n ﬁrms. If a subgame perfect equilibrium exists then each
ﬁrm solves the following maximization program given the equilibrium strategies of




























i } are the respective subgame perfect equilibrium values
of the n − 1 ﬁrms except i. The maximization program for each ﬁrm has to take




i ≤ ¯ Kt−1







i ≤ ¯ Kt
−i ∀i andt (72)
where ¯ xt−1
−i and ¯ Kt−1





i refer to the subgame perfect equilibrium in period t + 1.
The optimal value Ji,t(.) dependson the history zt−1, i.e. the MY C-equilibrium
in period t depends on the vector zt−1. We therefore can write
Ji,t(zt−1) = [(p(x
MY C,t






+δJi,t+1(xMY C,t,πMY C,t,cMY C,t)]







i ≤ ¯ Kt−1
−i , ∀i andt (74)
If we look at the respective deﬁnition of Ji,t+1 (utilizing (70) for period t + 1)
we see that zMY C,t+1 depends on the history zt = zMY C,t. Hence, we see that (73)
and the relevant constraints (72) and (74) deﬁne a closed loop equilibrium.





First of all observe that (73) and the regulatory constraint (74) do not depend
on πt−1. Hence, πt−1 does not inﬂuence the MY C-equilibrium of period t. Thus,
we can conﬁne the analysis to the eﬀects of xt−1
i andct−1
i . We diﬀerentiate Jit(.)


































−i ,ct−1}, i.e. is the history of the c-variables and the x- variables
except that of ﬁrm i.

















This follows from inspection of (70) and (74). Both equations do not depend on
xt−1




j , j  = i do not enter these equations.
Hence, indirect eﬀects through the eﬀects of xt−1
i on x
MY C,t
j do not enter Jit(.).






−i =const. = 0. (77)
where kt−1
−i = {xt−1,ct−1
−i }, i.e. the history of the x-variables and the c- variables




i}. Also, since Ji,t+1(.) does not depend on these variables the ﬁrst order
conditions are the same as for myopic ﬁrms, i.e. eqs. (40) and (41). Hence, the
sequence of Nash-equilibria of myopic ﬁrms are identical to the subgame perfect
equilibrium deﬁned in (70).
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